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This unique financial background of Mexico offers a concept approximately how lease looking allows fiscal development and explains why political instability isn't inevitably correlated with monetary stagnation. it truly is meant for historians of Latin the USA, students attracted to financial improvement, and political scientists attracted to the political foundations of development. Hb ISBN (2003): 0-521-82067-7
Read or Download The Politics of Property Rights: Political Instability, Credible Commitments, and Economic Growth in Mexico, 1876-1929 (Political Economy of Institutions and Decisions) PDF
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Additional info for The Politics of Property Rights: Political Instability, Credible Commitments, and Economic Growth in Mexico, 1876-1929 (Political Economy of Institutions and Decisions)
In addition, the GDP estimates that we have for the periods 1900–10 and 1920–29 are of doubtful reliability, drawn from imputed values and controlled conjectures rather than large bodies of empirical evidence. Mexico did not, in fact, carry out its first comprehensive industrial and agricultural censuses until 1930. The first input-output matrices for Mexico were not constructed until 1950. What researchers appear to have done in estimating GDP for earlier years was to use the limited data available on the output or export of particular commodities and plug them into the 1950 input-output matrix.
What they require is credible threats of retaliation by investors. These credible threats may come from the possibility of intervention by a foreign state on behalf of its citizens, a financial hostage, or the existence of a powerful political group whose interests have been aligned with investors through the formation of a rentseeking coalition. Indeed, as we shall show in both theory and practice, there are circumstances under which these mechanisms work better when the polity is unstable. We also realized that we had to depart from the traditions in the empirical literature on growth of employing cross-country regressions to test our model.
For an interesting discussion of a case where a hostage actually meets these conditions, and therefore works as a commitment mechanism, see Monaldi (2002), chaps. 4 and 5. 25 CY167-02 0521820677 January 27, 2003 9:1 Char Count= 0 The Politics of Property Rights contracts between individuals or corporations, third-party enforcement occurs all the time: the government, usually through its judicial system, serves as the third party. A third-party enforcer is a more complicated matter when one of the parties to the contract is the government.